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Better to Analyze a Statute than to
Psychoanalyze Congress? Eleventh
Circuit Widens Circuit Split over
Proper Causation Standard in
False Claims Act Retaliation Cases *
I. INTRODUCTION
“You’re fired!” Employees across America hear these words every day.1
Usually, the federal government has no interest in whether or why an
employee is fired. But when companies that do business with the federal
government improperly fire employees for reporting fraud, the interests
of the federal government and the general public are directly implicated.2
The implications are clear: employees suffer the tribulations of wrongful

* My sincere thanks to Professor Linda Jellum for her advice and feedback on this
Casenote. Her sage comments and wit invigorated me after each round of editing. I would
also like to thank Professor James Fleissner, who graciously reviewed and commented on
my second draft, and Isabella Wood, who generously offered very helpful suggestions.
Additionally, I would like to thank Student Writing Editor Sandy Davis-Campos for her
encouragement during the writing process. Finally, I would like to thank my family for
their unwavering love and support throughout law school. I feel especially fortunate to
follow my mother, a writer herself, in breaking into print.
1 Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey - August 2020, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/jolts_10062020.pdf (cataloguing
monthly data on job openings, hires, and separations in the United States).
2 See generally S. Rep. 110-507 (2008) (providing historical background and reporting
favorably from the Senate Judiciary Committee on The False Claims Act Correction Act of
2008, which sought to protect all Federal funds against fraud and enhance protections for
whistleblowers who report it); False Claims Act FAQ, NATIONAL WHISTLEBLOWER CENTER
(Nov. 13, 2020 6:25 PM), https://www.whistleblowers.org/faq/false-claims-act-qui-tam/
(offering short answers to common questions from potential whistleblowers regarding the
False Claims Act, including information about protection for those who report fraud and
face retaliation for doing so).
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termination, the government feels the strain on its resources, and
American taxpayers ultimately foot the bill.3
Healthcare providers and defense contractors are some of the federal
government’s largest business partners.4 Because the federal
government is a deep-pocketed and reliable payer, some providers seek
to grow their business by billing the federal government as much and as
often as possible. Sometimes, contractors and providers abuse their
billing privileges and cross the line into fraud.5 Well aware of this
phenomenon, Congress has relied on the False Claims Act (FCA)6 to
combat fraud and recover ill-gotten gains.7 To aid its effort in enforcing
the FCA, Congress encourages employees to report fraud and allows
them to share in any money that is successfully recovered.8
Congress recognizes that employees who report fraud to their
employers will often face backlash.9 To protect these employees, the FCA
allows them to sue employers that retaliate against them for engaging in
protected activity to uncover and report fraud.10 Employees who sue their

3 S. Rep. 110-507, at 7–8 (2008). Notably, because fraud undermines public confidence
in the government’s ability to manage its affairs, the harm from fraud is not measured
strictly in dollars and cents. Effective fraud enforcement tools provide the government an
opportunity “to win back the hearts and minds of taxpayers who believe the Government
does not care how taxpayer dollars are spent.” Id. at 8.
4 Heidi Peltier, The Growth of the “Camo Economy” and the Commercialization of the
Post-9/11 Wars, 20 Years of War Costs of War Research Series (Jun. 30, 2020),
https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2020/Peltier%202020%20%20Growth%20of%20Camo%20Economy%20-%20June%2030%202020%20%20FINAL.pdf (noting that the Pentagon spent $370 billion on contracting in 2019 and
demonstrating that military contracting is often more expensive than the government
performing those services itself); Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System, TAX POLICY CENTER
BRIEFING BOOK (May 2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-muchdoes-federal-government-spend-health-care (indicating that the federal government spent
almost $1.2 trillion on health care in 2019).
5 S. Rep. 110-507, at 7–8 (2008) (noting that the federal government recovered roughly
$8 billion from healthcare providers and over $1.6 billion from defense contractors between
1986 and 2008); Fraud Statistics – Overview, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CIVIL DIVISION
(Sept.
30,
2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1233201/download
(calculating that the federal government recovered over $41 billion from healthcare
providers and $6 billion from defense contractors between 1986 and 2019).
6 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733.
7 See generally S. Rep. 110-507 (2008).
8 S. Rep. 110-507, at 5 (2008) (noting that, in most cases, whistleblowers who come
forward and contribute to a successful fraud recovery stand to receive some portion of the
money recovered).
9 Id. (recognizing that whistleblowers take a risk when reporting fraud against the
government).
10 Id.
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employers for retaliation can be reinstated and receive double back pay.11
To prevail, employees must prove that an employer fired them “because
of” their engagement in protected conduct.12
Whether an employee’s complaints must be essential to or merely a
consideration in an employer’s decision to retaliate is frequently disputed
in FCA retaliation cases. Courts are split on the issue.13 In 2020, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided Nesbitt
v. Candler Cnty., in which the court held that an employee must prove
that her complaints were essential to her employer’s retaliation
decision.14 In doing so, the court widened a circuit split on how to
interpret the antiretaliation provision of the FCA.15 As a result, the
geographic location in which employees happen to work will often affect
the protections afforded to them for reporting fraud against the federal
government.16
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Jamie Nesbitt began working for the Candler County ambulance
service (the County) in 2006. He was an emergency medical technician
(EMT). Several years into his tenure, Nesbitt’s colleague, Donald Greer,
was promoted from EMT to deputy director of the ambulance service.
Following Greer’s promotion, Nesbitt noticed problems and clashed with
his supervisors.
As EMTs, Nesbitt and his coworkers had to complete “trip reports,”
which had to be filled out following each ambulance ride. The trip reports
contained information about the condition of the patient and the medical

31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(2) provides that “[r]elief” shall include
reinstatement with the same seniority status that [the] employee, contractor, or
agent would have had but for the discrimination, 2 times the amount of back pay,
interest on the back pay, and compensation for any special damages sustained
as a result of the discrimination, including litigation costs and reasonable
attorneys’ fees. An action under this subsection may be brought in the
appropriate district court of the United States for the relief provided in this
subsection.
(emphasis added).
12 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1).
13 Nesbitt v. Candler Cnty., 945 F.3d 1355, 1360–61 (11th Cir. 2020) (discussing circuit
split between the District of Columbia, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, on the one hand, and
the Third and Fifth Circuits, on the other).
14 Id. at 1359.
15 Id. at 1360–61.
16 S. Rep. 110-507, at 9 (2008) (pointing out that “conflicting interpretations from courts
across the country . . . make the outcomes of FCA cases unclear–not based upon facts, but
based upon where the case is filed–and significantly undermine the effectiveness of the
FCA.”).
11
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necessity of the ambulance service. Based on the contents of the narrative
section of each trip report, Medicare determines whether to reimburse
ambulance providers for their services.17
As deputy director, Greer ordered Nesbitt and other EMTs under his
direction to write in their trip report narratives that patients were
non-ambulatory, regardless of whether or not the patients could walk.
This practice would enable the County to bill Medicare for the trips.
Nesbitt believed this practice was fraudulent, so he complained to Greer
and other County officials.
Following the complaints, Greer reduced Nesbitt’s work schedule.
Normally, EMTs were scheduled to work two twenty-four-hour shifts per
week. In addition, they would be on call for two more twenty-four-hour
shifts. The on-call shifts allowed EMTs to work overtime and, thus, earn
higher pay. Greer limited Nesbitt’s on-call shifts to twelve hours instead
of twenty-four, which reduced Nesbitt’s income.
After the County reduced Nesbitt’s hours and pay, Nesbitt took a
second job, working as an EMT at a private ambulance company called
Meddixx.18 Although Greer approved Nesbitt’s taking a second job, a
County policy forbade employees to have side jobs without approval from
the ambulance service director.19 Nesbitt assumed that David Moore, the
ambulance service director, knew and approved of his Meddixx job, but
Moore claimed he knew nothing about it.
Greer and Moore recommended to the County Administrator, William
Lindsey, that Nesbitt be fired.20 They said that Nesbitt refused to follow
orders and that he “violated the County’s policy on side jobs.”21 The Board
of Commissioners voted to fire Nesbitt.22 Thereafter, Greer and Moore
summoned Nesbitt to Greer’s office, where they gave him a letter that
provided two reasons for firing him.23 First, he took an unauthorized side

Nesbitt, 945 F.3d at 1356.
Id.
19 Id. at 1356–57.
20 Id. at 1357.
21 Id.
22 The County fired Nesbitt in 2014, after he raised his complaints. The five-member
Board of Commissioners had the exclusive “authority to hire and fire County employees.”
Nesbitt, 945 F.3d at 1357. Under the County hierarchy, EMTs reported to the emergency
medical services director, who reported to the County Administrator, who reported to the
Board. Nesbitt v. Candler Cnty., No. 6:14-cv-094, 2018 WL 6356420, at * 1 (S.D. Ga. 2018).
A department head or the County Administrator would usually recommend to an individual
Board member that an employee ought to be fired. The Board member would then relay
that recommendation to the full Board, which would then discuss and vote on it. Nesbitt,
2018 WL 6356420, at * 1.
23 Nesbitt, 945 F.3d at 1357.
17
18
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job with Meddixx, and second, Nesbitt refused to “fill out trip reports in
‘the proper way.’”24
In August 2014, after the County fired him, Nesbitt sued under the
FCA and the Georgia False Medicaid Claims Act, O.C.G.A. §§ 49-4-168–
168.6,25 alleging that the County fraudulently billed for ambulance
services and fired him in retaliation for whistleblowing. In June 2016,
the United States intervened. The parties reached a settlement in which
Nesbitt and the government voluntarily dismissed the fraud claims.
However, Nesbitt’s retaliation claim proceeded.26 The United States
District Court for the Southern District of Georgia granted summary
judgment for the County.27 Although the district court acknowledged that
Nesbitt had engaged in “protected conduct,” it found that there was no
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the County fired
Nesbitt for the reasons the County provided.28 Nesbitt appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.29
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. False Claims Act
Congress enacted the FCA during the Civil War to combat fraud.30 As
the federal government sought out private contractors to aid the war
effort, unscrupulous suppliers sold the government raggedy uniforms,
infantry boots made of cardboard, rotted ship hulls freshly painted to
disguise their age, and gunpowder barrels filled with sawdust.31
Suppliers also sold the same mules “over and over again to Army
quartermasters.”32 In response, Congress enacted and President Lincoln

24

Id.

25 O.C.G.A.

§§ 49-4-168–168.6 (2020).
the FCA, whistleblowers typically pursue fraud claims jointly with the federal
government. These fraud claims are separate from any retaliation claims. Thus, even if the
fraud claims are released, whistleblowers can proceed independently with their retaliation
claims. See Nesbitt, 945 F.3d at 1357.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 37 Cong. Ch. 67, March 2, 1863, 12 Stat. 696. For an interesting and extensive history
of the FCA by an attorney intimately acquainted with its evolution over the last thirty-five
years, see James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years for
Rogues, Privateers, Parasites and Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1261 (2013).
31 Helmer, supra note 30, at 1264–65.
32 Id. at 1264.
26 Under
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signed the FCA33 on March 2, 1863 to “prevent and punish Frauds upon
the Government of the United States.”34 The FCA allowed anyone
to bring an action on behalf of the United States against a government
contractor who knowingly submitted false claims for payment to the
Government. If the suit was successful, the offending contractor was
required to pay double damages and a $2,000 per false claim penalty.
The successful relator would receive 50% of the amount recovered.35

The idea was to make the United States whole and allow the relator36
to share in the recovery.37
Although the FCA was successful for many years, Congress scaled
back the provisions to allow private parties to sue on behalf of the United
States during World War II, and its use declined sharply in the following
four decades.38 In the 1980s, due to President Reagan’s defense build-up
against the Soviet Union, military spending rose dramatically.39 At the
same time, alarming reports of government contractors perpetrating
fraud against the United States surfaced.40 Congress acted. It passed the
False Claims Amendments Act of 1986,41 which reinvigorated the private
whistleblower provisions of the FCA.42

31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733.
37 Cong. Ch. 67, March 2, 1863, 12 Stat. 696.
35 Helmer, supra note 30, at 1266.
36 “Relator” is the term used to refer to private individuals who bring FCA suits on behalf
of the government. These suits are usually captioned, “United States ex rel.” See, e.g., United
States ex rel. King v. Solvay Pharms., Inc., 871 F.3d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 2017); United States
ex rel. Ziebell v. Fox Valley Workforce Dev. Bd., Inc., 806 F.3d 946, 953 (7th Cir. 2015). Ex
rel. is the Latin short form of ex relatione, which means by or on the relation of. A “suit ex
rel. is typically brought by the government upon the application of a private party (called a
relator) who is interested in the matter.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
37 Helmer, supra note 30, at 1266.
38 Id. at 1266–71 (2013). Congress eliminated the 50% bounty awarded to successful
relators in response to pressure from Attorney General Francis Biddle to eliminate
“parasitic lawsuits.” In such lawsuits, citizens who knew about the FCA would hide out in
federal courthouses waiting to observe criminal prosecutions against defense contractors.
Once these opportunistic citizens discovered criminal prosecutions, they would file FCA
whistleblower actions against the defense contractors and hope to collect a relator’s share
of any recovery. Id.
39 Id. at 1271.
40 Id. at 1271–72. For example, reports indicated that the Navy was being charged $400
for hammers, $7,000 for coffee pots, $660 for ashtrays, and $400 for socket wrenches. Id.
41 Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 4, 100 Stat. 3153.
42 Helmer, supra note 30, at 1273–74.
33
34
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B. Antiretaliation Provision
When Congress reinvigorated the whistleblower provisions in the 1986
Amendments to the FCA, it also added an antiretaliation provision.43
That provision, codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1), protects
whistleblowers from retaliation by their employers:44
Any employee, contractor, or agent shall be entitled to all relief
necessary to make that employee, contractor, or agent whole, if that
employee, contractor, or agent is discharged, demoted, suspended,
threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against
in the terms and conditions of employment because of lawful acts done
by the employee, contractor, agent or associated others in furtherance
of an action under this section or other efforts to stop [one] or more
violations of this subchapter.45

The Senate Judiciary Committee reported that Congress was seeking
“to halt companies and individuals from using the threat of economic
retaliation to silence ‘whistleblowers,’ as well as to assure those who may
be considering exposing fraud that they are legally protected from
retaliatory acts.”46 The Committee was guided by whistleblower
protection provisions in Federal safety and environmental statutes.47
The meaning of the words “because of” in the provision above are at
the heart of the controversy in many FCA retaliation cases.48 Without
explaining why, courts either find the language ambiguous and examine
the legislative history of the Act to resolve that ambiguity or find the
language unambiguous and refuse to consider the legislative history to
confirm the ordinary meaning.49

S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 34, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5299.
Congress modified this provision in 2009 in the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-21 § 4, 123 Stat. 1617, 1621–25 (2009). The whistleblower protection
provision was broadened to include protection for those reporting actions done by
contractors and agents in furtherance of FCA Actions. In 2010, Congress added § 3730(h)(3)
to clarify that the statute of limitations “for all retaliation cases would be three years after
the date of the retaliation.” Helmer, supra note 30, at 1279–80.
45 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1) (emphasis added).
46 S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 34, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5299.
47 Id. The Committee cited examples including the Federal Surface Mining Act, the
Energy Reorganization Act, Clean Air Act, Safe Drinking Water Act, Solid Waste Disposal
Act, Water Pollution Control Act, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act, and the Toxic Substances Control Act. Id.
48 See, e.g., Nesbitt, 945 F.3d at 1361–62; Yesudian v. Howard University, 153 F.3d 731,
736 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
49 See, e.g., Nesbitt, 945 F.3d at 1361–62; Yesudian, 153 F.3d at 736.
43
44
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C. The Meaning of “Because Of”
Despite their differing interpretive approaches, courts uniformly agree
that the language “because of” is a standard of causation.50 They
disagree, however, on whether the language requires the “motivating
factor” standard or the “but-for” standard of causation.51 The motivating
factor standard is less stringent than the but-for standard.52 In both
cases, the employee made a whistleblowing claim and then was fired.
Under the motivating factor standard, the employee only needs to show
that the whistleblowing claim had a tendency to bring about or influence
the employer’s firing decision.53 In contrast, under the but-for54 standard,
the employee must show that, absent the whistleblowing claim, she
would not have been fired.55
The legislative history from the 1986 Amendments better supports the
conclusion that “because of” requires the motivating factor standard of
causation. Specifically, the Senate Judiciary Committee, in its report
accompanying the adoption of the antiretaliation provision in 1986, wrote
that “because of” means “the whistleblower must show the employer had
See, e.g., Nesbitt, 945 F.3d at 1361–62; Yesudian, 153 F.3d at 736.
See, e.g., Nesbitt, 945 F.3d at 1361–62; Yesudian, 153 F.3d at 736.
52 See Lauren Smith, Motivating Factor versus But-for Causation in Claims Arising
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 643, 644–46 (2017) (pointing
out that “[w]hen a specific factor is but one of multiple factors considered, it does not rise
to the more stringent standard of but-for causation” and arguing that “precedent, the plain
language of the ADA, and Congress’s stated purposes in enacting the [ADA]” point to the
conclusion that the motivating factor standard is appropriate). The motivating factor and
but-for causation standards are borrowed from employment law. Id.
53 Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really), 59 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 652–53
(2008) (contradistinguishing the two different causation standards as used in disparate
treatment employment discrimination cases).
54 A “but-for cause” is defined as “[t]he cause without which the event could not have
occurred.” It is also “termed actual cause; cause in fact; factual cause.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
55 Katz, supra note 53, at 653. Katz helpfully expands on the difference between the two
standards:
There are two different causal standards available under current disparate
treatment law: necessity (often called “but for” causation) and minimal causation
(often called “motivating factor” causation). A factor is necessary to (a “but for”
cause of) an event where, absent that factor, the event would not have occurred
when it did. A factor is minimally causal (a “motivating factor”) where it has a
tendency to bring about the event, but does not rise to the level of being
necessary. By definition, necessity (“but for” causation) is more restrictive than
minimal causation (“motivating factor”): a factor is minimally causal (a
“motivating factor”) if and only if it does not rise to the level of being necessary
(a “but for” cause).
Id. at 652–53 (footnotes omitted).
50
51
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knowledge the employee engaged in protected activity” and that “the
retaliation was motivated, at least in part, by the employee’s engaging in
protected activity.”56 Some courts have quoted this language when
analyzing the antiretaliation provision.57 By contrast, other courts have
refused to consider this language and reached a different interpretation,
based on the ordinary meaning of the statute’s text.58 These courts refer
to their interpretation as the “but-for” standard of causation.59
Depending on a court’s view, the outcome of a case may turn on the
standard of causation that applies to retaliation claims.60 The United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals are split on whether to apply the
motivating factor standard or the but-for standard in FCA retaliation
cases.61 The following sections explore these two standards and why
courts differ on the correct standard.
1. The Case for Using the Motivating Factor Standard
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C.)
Circuit, the Sixth Circuit, and the Seventh Circuit use the motivating
factor standard. In 1998, in United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard
University, the D.C. Circuit reversed a district court’s grant of judgment
as a matter of law on the plaintiff’s retaliation claim under the FCA.62 In
that case, Dr. Daniel Yesudian worked in the University’s purchasing
department, where he discovered and repeatedly complained to
high-level university officials that the department’s director committed
several financial improprieties. The director allegedly falsified
employees’ time reports, provided vendors confidential information to
give them an advantage when bidding for projects, accepted bribes,
approved fraudulent payments, and took university property home.63
Before analyzing the antiretaliation provision specifically, the court in
Yesudian provided a brief history of the FCA and emphasized the law’s
purpose.64 The court noted that Congress originally passed the FCA “to
S. Rep. No. 99–345, at 35, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5300 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Yesudian, 153 F.3d at 731–49.
58 See Nesbitt, 945 F.3d at 1359; DiFiore v. CSL Behring, LLC, 879 F.3d 71, 76–78 (3d
Cir. 2018); King, 871 F.3d at 333.
59 Nesbitt, 945 F.3d at 1357.
60 Id.
61 See Nesbitt, 945 F.3d at 1360; DiFiore, 879 F.3d at 76-78; King, 871 F.3d at 333;
Singletary v. Howard Univ., 939 F.3d 287, 293 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Ziebell, 806 F.3d at 953;
McKenzie v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 219 F.3d 508, 518 (6th Cir. 2000).
62 153 F.3d 731, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The court also affirmed the district court’s denial
of judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. Id.
63 Id. at 734.
64 Id. at 735–36.
56
57
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combat widespread fraud in defense contracts during the Civil War.”65
Regarding the 1986 amendment, the court pointed out the purpose of and
quoted the antiretaliation provision.66 Quoting the Senate report and
citing cases from the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, the D.C. Circuit noted
that, to establish the “because of” element, an employee must show that
the employer knew the employee was engaged in protected activity and
“the retaliation was motivated, at least in part, by the employee’s
engaging in [that] protected activity.”67 Thus, after considering the
legislative history and the statute’s purpose, the D.C. Circuit adopted the
motivating factor standard of causation.68 The D.C. Circuit followed its
decision69 to adopt the motivating factor standard once in United States
ex rel. Schweizer v. Oce N.V.70 and again in Singletary v. Howard
University.71
Similarly, a few years after Yesudian, the Sixth Circuit adopted the
motivating
factor
standard
in
McKenzie
v.
Bellsouth
Telecommunications., Inc.72 In McKenzie, the court heard an appeal from
a district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant in an FCA
retaliation action.73 McKenzie’s claim required proof that her employer

65 Id. at 736 (citing S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 8, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5266,
5273).
66 Id.
67 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 35, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5300).
68 The Nesbitt court claimed, incorrectly, that the Yesudian court ignored the ordinary
meaning of “because of” and relied solely on the Senate report. Nesbitt, 945 F.3d 1360. That
claim overlooks the fact that the Yesudian court also looked to the statute’s purpose.
69 Like other circuits, a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit is constrained to follow its
circuit precedent. Florida Bankers Ass’n v. U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, 799 F.3d 1065, 1073
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (citing LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (stating that one three-judge panel lacks the “authority to
overrule another three-judge panel of the court.”); Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the
Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 NEV. L.J. 787, 795 (2012) (explaining that, in all but
the Seventh Circuit, “a subsequent panel is bound by the holding of a previously published
decision in that circuit.”).
70 677 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
71 939 F.3d 287 (D.C. Cir. 2019). In Singletary, the court, as it did in Yesudian,
mentioned the historical purpose of the FCA to combat fraud by Civil War contractors. Id.
at 292–93. It noted that the FCA protects whistleblowers to enhance enforcement of the
law and stated that, to make out a claim for retaliation, plaintiffs must show that their
employer was motivated, at least in part, by the plaintiff’s protected activity. Id. at 293.
The court reaffirmed the motivating factor standard in spite of what other circuits had done
in the interim. DiFiore, 879 F.3d at 76–78 (adopting but-for standard of causation in FCA
retaliation cases); King, 871 F.3d at 333 (same).
72 219 F.3d 508, 518 (6th Cir. 2000).
73 Id. at 510.
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retaliated against her because of actions she took while pursuing an FCA
claim.74 To determine the meaning of “because of,” the court relied on the
legislative history in the Senate Judiciary Committee report: “the
employee must show that ‘the retaliation was motivated at least in part
by the employee’s engaging in protected activity.’”75 After quoting the
Senate report, the court reasoned that McKenzie failed to show that
Bellsouth was aware of her protected activity and held that Bellsouth’s
decision to fire her could not have been motivated by her protected
activity.76 The only source of meaning the court considered in
determining the meaning of “because of” was the Senate committee
report, which showed the legislature’s specific intent regarding the
meaning of “because of.”77 The Sixth Circuit has not considered this issue
since McKenzie.
Unlike the D.C. Circuit and the Sixth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit has
never evaluated the correctness of the motivating factor standard, even
while using it. In Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Management Associates,
Ltd.,78 the Seventh Circuit heard an appeal for retaliatory discharge
under Illinois law.79 In addition to the retaliatory discharge claim, the
court addressed in dicta whether the plaintiff could bring an FCA
retaliation claim as an alternative remedy.80 The court specified the
elements the plaintiff had to prove for an FCA retaliation claim, and it
cited Yesudian to support its conclusion that the discharge must have
been “motivated, at least in part, by the protected conduct.”81 Thus, the
Seventh Circuit followed the D.C. Circuit and adopted the motivating
factor standard. In later cases, the Seventh Circuit relied on Brandon to
apply the motivating factor standard in both Fanslow v. Chicago

Id. at 518.
Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 35, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5300).
76 Id.
77 Id. The court did not use the plain meaning canon. See LINDA D. JELLUM, THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, 126
(2d ed., Carolina Academic Press 2021) (explaining that under the plain meaning canon
courts presume that words bear their ordinary meaning, which is what most people would
think the words mean). Nor did the court address ambiguity, which “refers to words and
phrases that have more than one ordinary meaning.” Id. at Chp. 7. The fact that courts
disagree on the meaning of “because of” strongly suggests that the phrase is ambiguous.
When ambiguity is present, “judges will turn to sources of meaning other than the text,
such as the other intrinsic sources, extrinsic sources, and policy-based sources.” Id. at 269.
78 277 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2002).
79 Id. at 938.
80 Id. at 943–44.
81 Id. at 944 (quoting Yesudian, 153 F.3d at 736).
74
75
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Manufacturing Center, Inc.82 and United States ex rel. Ziebell v. Fox
Valley Workforce Dev. Bd., Inc.83
2. The Case for Using the But-for Standard
In contrast, the Fifth and Third Circuits have rejected the motivating
factor standard and adopted the but-for standard.84 These circuits made
this choice as a response to two Supreme Court cases that addressed the
meaning of “because of” outside the FCA context—Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc.85 and University of Texas Southwestern Medical
Center v. Nassar.86
In Gross, the Supreme Court analyzed the words “because of” in the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act,87 which provides: “[i]t shall be
unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s age[.]”88 In analyzing this language, the
Court said it would begin with the text and assume that the ordinary
meaning of that text expressed the legislature’s purpose.89 To start, the
Court cited the dictionary and said that “because of” means “by reason
of: on account of.”90 The Court then concluded that “by reason of” requires
showing but-for causation.91 The Court cited three cases in support of its

384 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2004).
806 F.3d 946, 953 (7th Cir. 2015). The Seventh Circuit has never explicitly
transitioned away from using the motivating factor standard, but the future looks less
certain based on a couple of cases decided in the last five years. In United States ex rel.
Marshall v. Woodward, Inc., the court applied the but-for standard, but only because the
parties agreed that it was the correct standard under the FCA and Illinois law for the
plaintiff’s state-law claim. 812 F.3d 556, 564 (7th Cir. 2015). A few years after Marshall,
the court decided Heath v. Indianapolis Fire Department, 889 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2018), in
which it mentioned in dicta that reconsidering the Circuit’s holding in Fanslow to use the
motivating factor standard might be warranted in a future case. Heath, 889 F.3d at 874.
The court cited a decision from the Fifth Circuit, King, and a decision from the Supreme
Court, University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013), as
reasons for reconsidering the applicable causation standard. Heath, 889 F.3d at 874.
84 DiFiore, 879 F.3d at 76–78; King, 871 F.3d at 333.
85 557 U.S. 167 (2009). Justice Thomas wrote the opinion of the court for a 5-4 majority.
86 570 U.S. 338 (2013). The language at issue in Nassar was “because” rather than
“because of,” but the Supreme Court concluded that the difference was not meaningful. Id.
at 352.
87 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634.
88 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1) (emphasis added).
89 Gross, 557 U.S. at 175.
90 Id. at 176 (citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 194 (1966)).
91 Id.
82
83

2021

BETTER TO ANALYZE

1389

conclusion.92 Thus, to prove a retaliation claim under the ADEA, a
plaintiff must show that “age was the but-for cause of the employer’s
adverse decision.”93
Four years after Gross, the Supreme Court decided University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar. In Nassar the Court addressed
the standard of causation for Title VII retaliation claims.94 The Court
started by saying that Congress legislated against the background of
common law tort principles, which provide that, for an act to be
considered the cause of an outcome, the outcome must not have occurred
without—that is, but for—that act.95 Next, the court pointed out that
Title VII prohibits two categories of employer conduct, each involving
distinct causation standards.96 The first category involves discrimination
by an employer based on an employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.97 The Court noted that in Congress’s 1991 amendments
to Title VII, Congress explicitly included a provision with a lower
causation standard.98
92 Id. (citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) (ruling that age must
be a but-for cause in ADEA disparate-treatment claims); Bridge v. Phoenix Bond &
Indemnity Co., 553 U.S. 639, 652–55 (2008) (stating that “by reason of” requires showing
but-for causation); Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 63–64 (2007) (observing
that “based on” indicates a but-for causal relationship in common talk).
93 Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 (internal quotation marks omitted). Notably, Gross was a 5-4
decision. Justice Stevens wrote a dissent, in which he raised two significant points. First,
he said “[t]he most natural reading of this statutory text prohibits adverse employment
actions motivated in whole or in part by the age of the employee.” Second, Justice Stevens
noted that the but-for causation standard adopted in Gross was advanced in dissent by
Justice Kennedy in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 279 (1989), which
interpreted identical language in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Stevens
emphasized that, after the Supreme Court rejected the but-for standard in Price
Waterhouse, Congress amended Title VII in 1991 and also rejected the but-for standard.
Gross, 557 U.S. at 180–81 (Steven, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also wrote a dissent, in
which he argued that a but-for causation standard makes sense in tort cases involving the
movement of physical forces, but the standard does not make sense in the hazier realm of
assessing an employer’s motive. Justice Breyer further stated that, because an employer
inevitably knows more about its motives than the employee, “[a]ll that a plaintiff can know
for certain in such a context is that the forbidden motive did play a role in the employer’s
decision.” Gross, 557 U.S. at 190–91 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
94 Nassar, 570 U.S. at 346.
95 Id. at 346–47.
96 Id. at 347.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 348–49. The new provision, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), provides: “[A]n
unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates
that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” Nassar, 570 U.S. at 348–
49 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
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The second category involves employer-based retaliation for protected
conduct by employees; it contains two criteria, as laid out in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a):
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any [employee] . . . because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this title, or
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
title.99

After discussing its holding in Gross, the Court held that the word
“because” in the antiretaliation provision of Title VII has the same
meaning as “because of” in the ADEA.100 The Court extensively analyzed
counterarguments to adopting the but-for causation standard, but
ultimately rejected that standard based on the clarity of the text and the
section’s fit within the act as a whole.101
Because of these decisions, the Fifth Circuit used the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Gross and Nassar to apply the but-for standard in United
States ex rel. King v. Solvay Pharms., Inc.102 In King, the court reviewed
a district judge’s grant of summary judgment against a relator’s
retaliation claim.103 The court interpreted the words “because of” in the
antiretaliation provision of the FCA.104 Without much analysis, the court
concluded that the but-for causation standard applied.105 To support its
conclusion, the court merely cited Gross and Nassar and included
parenthetical notes in the citation for each case.106
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (citations omitted).
Nassar, 570 U.S. at 352.
101 Id. at 352–60. Like Gross, Nassar was a 5-4 decision. Justice Ginsburg wrote the
dissent, in which she argued that status-based discrimination based on immutable
characteristics and employer retaliation for complaining of such discrimination are
inextricably linked. Because of that link, she wrote, adopting a lesser causation standard
for status-based discrimination and a heightened but-for causation standard for retaliation
makes little sense. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 363–64 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
102 871 F.3d 318 (5th Cir. 2017).
103 Id. at 323. The case also involved other FCA claims and a partial grant of court costs
to the defendant. Id.
104 Id. at 333.
105 Id.
106 Id. In the citation for Gross, the Fifth Circuit merely quoted the Supreme Court’s
holding: “the language ‘because of’ requires a ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse
decision under ADEA retaliation claims.” Id. (quoting Gross, 557 U.S. at 176). In addressing
Nassar, the court provided a quote in which the Supreme Court stated that there was no
meaningful difference between the text at issue in Gross and in Nassar, and as such the
obvious conclusion was that plaintiffs pursing retaliation claims under Title VII must prove
99

100
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The Third Circuit also followed Gross and Nassar when it adopted the
but-for standard. In DiFiore v. CSL Behring, LLC,107 the plaintiff brought
a claim against her former employer for retaliation in violation of the
FCA.108 After losing on summary judgment, the plaintiff appealed,
arguing that the district court’s instruction to the jury regarding use of
the but-for causation standard was erroneous.109 On appeal, the Third
Circuit stated that the district court’s jury instruction to apply the but-for
causation standard was a correct application of Supreme Court case
law.110 The court then cited Gross and Nassar and explained why it
believed the reasoning in those decisions applied to FCA retaliation
claims.111 It said that the Supreme Court looked to the ordinary meaning
of the words “because of” to determine that the but-for causation
standard applied.112 Because the language in the FCA retaliation
provision (“because of”) is almost identical to the language the Supreme
Court interpreted in Gross and Nassar, the Third Circuit concluded that
FCA retaliation claims require proof of but-for causation.113
IV. COURT’S RATIONALE
The Eleventh Circuit followed the Third and Fifth Circuits in adopting
the but-for standard in Nesbitt v. Candler County.114 The only issue on
appeal in Nesbitt was whether the but-for standard or the motivating
factor standard applied.115 The court adopted the but-for standard, and
in doing so foreclosed any possibility of Nesbitt surviving summary
judgment.116
an employer’s desire to retaliate was the “but-for cause of the challenged employment
action.” King, 871 F.3d at 333 (quoting Nassar, 570 U.S. at 352).
107 879 F.3d 71, 76-78 (3d Cir. 2018).
108 Id. at 73. The plaintiff also asserted a claim of “wrongful discharge under a theory of
constructive discharge in violation of Pennsylvania state law.” Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 76.
111 Id. at 76–77. The court also disposed of the plaintiff’s argument that the Third Circuit
was bound by its prior decision in Hutchins v. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, 253 F.3d 176,
186 (3d Cir. 2001). In Hutchins, the court recited in dicta that the elements of an FCA
retaliation claim require using the but-for causation standard. Id.
112 DiFiore, 879 F.3d at 76.
113 Id. at 78.
114 Nesbitt, 945 F.3d at 1359.
115 Id. at 1357.
116 Id. at 1359. At oral argument, Nesbitt’s lawyer conceded, perhaps unwisely, that
Nesbitt would lose the case if the court adopted the but-for standard instead of the
motivating factor standard. The court accepted the concession and agreed that Nesbitt
would lose under the but-for standard. Id. at 1357–58. This concession was especially
concerning considering that but-for causation arguably does not impose a significantly
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In its opinion, the court conspicuously framed the issue in the case as
a “choice” it had to make between the two different standards.117 Taking
a textualist approach, the court said, it “must begin, and often should end
as well, with the language of the statute itself.”118 The court believed that
the language at issue was unambiguous because the Supreme Court had
already interpreted this language, albeit in other, unrelated statutes, as
explained above.119 Given the “because of” language, the court surmised
that the Supreme Court’s interpretations in Gross and Nassar did the
necessary work to interpret that phrase.120 The Eleventh Circuit
concluded that it was constrained to follow the interpretation of “because
of” in those two cases because the language in the FCA was “identical or
materially identical.”121
Oddly, however, the court pivoted and claimed that Congress had
already made the choice of which causation standard to apply by choosing
the words “because of.”122 Without citing any authority, the court said
that, in using these unambiguous words in the antiretaliation provision,
Congress had been clear about its intent.123
In its review of Gross, the court quoted the relevant provision of the
ADEA that contains the phrase “because of” and stated that the Supreme
Court ruled that age must be a but-for cause of an employer’s adverse
decision.124 The court noted the Supreme Court’s observation that the
ordinary meaning of “because of” is “by reason of: on account of.”125 The
court then repeated the Supreme Court’s holding that age must have a
determinative influence on an employer’s decision.126
Next, the court discussed Nassar and the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the word “because” in the antiretaliation provision of

higher burden than motivating factor causation. See, e.g., Kawn v. Andalex Group LLC, 737
F.3d 834, 845 (2d Cir. 2013) (reasoning that temporal proximity between an employee’s
complaints and an employer’s retaliation, when combined with other evidence such as
inconsistent employer explanations, may be sufficient to defeat summary judgment).
117 Nesbitt, 945 F.3d at 1358.
118 Id. (quoting United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
119 Nesbitt, 945 F.3d at 1358–59.
120 Id. at 1358.
121 Id. at 1359.
122 Id. at 1358.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1359.
125 Id.
126 Id.
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Title VII.127 The court noted two premises from which the Supreme Court
reasoned. First, Congress incorporated familiar tort principles into
federal tort statutes—i.e., causation means but-for causation.128 Second,
Gross provided insight into the correct way to interpret the word
“because” by looking to its ordinary meaning.129 The court emphasized
that the Supreme Court “focused on the statute’s text.”130 It then noted
that the Supreme Court rejected counterarguments based on prior
precedent, Congress’s 1991 Amendments to Title VII, and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission’s interpretation of the statute.131
Based on its reading of Gross and Nassar, the Eleventh Circuit
expressed its conviction that “the but-for causation standard applies to
claims under the antiretaliation provision of the False Claims Act just as
it does to the antiretaliation provision of Title VII and the
antidiscrimination provision of the ADEA.”132 The court said the key
language is “identical or materially identical in all three statutes.”133
Given the identical nature of the language in the statutes, the court
stated it was duty-bound as an inferior court to follow the Supreme
Court’s decisions.134 The court pointed out that other circuits took the
same approach of following Gross and Nassar, which led it to conclude
that the but-for standard of causation applied.135
The Eleventh Circuit recognized that the Sixth, Seventh, and D.C.
Circuits used the motivating factor standard, but it criticized them for
doing so.136 First, it criticized the Sixth Circuit for not considering the
ordinary meaning of the language “because of” in the statute when it
decided McKenzie.137 The court noted that the Sixth Circuit considered
127 Id. Interestingly, the Supreme Court recently addressed using the but-for causation
standard for Title VII claims in its landmark decision in Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S.
Ct. 1731 (2020). The Court cited Gross and Nassar and reasoned thus:
Title VII’s ‘because of’ test incorporates the ‘simple’ and ‘traditional’ standard of
but-for causation. That form of causation is established whenever a particular
outcome would not have happened ‘but-for’ the purported cause. In other words,
a but-for test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome
changes. If it does, we have found a but-for cause.
Id. at 1739 (internal citations omitted).
128 Nesbitt, 945 F.3d at 1359.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1360 (citing U.S. CONST. ART. III, § 1).
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.

1394

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 72

only a Senate report to interpret the language and also pointed out that
the Sixth Circuit has not revisited the question since Gross and Nassar
were decided.138
Next, the court attacked the D.C. Circuit for failing to focus on the
ordinary meaning of the words “because of” and instead adopting the
motivating factor standard in Yesudian based on the same Senate report
the Sixth Circuit used.139 The court derided the D.C. Circuit for failing to
reconsider the rule it adopted in Yesudian after the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Gross and Nassar.140 The D.C. Circuit followed its circuit
precedent once after Gross when it decided Schweizer and once again
after Gross and Nassar when it decided Singletary.141
Finally,142 the court turned to the Seventh Circuit, criticizing it for
adopting the motivating factor standard based on the D.C. Circuit’s
decision in Yesudian and without conducting its own analysis.143
Although some of the Seventh Circuit’s subsequent decisions suggested
it may reconsider the proper causation standard for FCA retaliation
claims, particularly given Gross and Nassar, the court begrudgingly
concluded that the motivating factor standard remains in force in the
Seventh Circuit.144
The court concluded its opinion by summarizing the basis of the circuit
split on the issue of which causation standard to apply.145 It said the
circuits which disagreed with the but-for causation standard did so based
on an erroneous focus on legislative history or following law from another
circuit that relied on legislative history.146 In response to the plaintiff’s
invitation to rely on legislative history, the court drew a line in the sand:
“we should not, cannot, and do not use legislative history to get around
the plain meaning of a statute’s text.” 147 The court said the statutory text
Id.
Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 The court also added in a footnote that it could not determine whether the Eighth
Circuit applies the motivating factor standard, but noted that if it did, the Eighth Circuit
was also incorrect. Nesbitt, 945 F.3d at 1361, n.2.
143 Nesbitt, 945 F.3d at 1360–61.
144 Id. at 1361.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. The court ended its opinion with a rhetorical flourish by paraphrasing one of
Justice Jackson’s many colorful statements: “it is better to analyze a statute than it is to
psychoanalyze Congress; resorting to legislative history is less interpreting statutory
language than recreating it.” Id. at 1362. Although this statement exerts considerable force,
an important distinction exists between resorting to legislative history and reviewing it
while sleuthing around to uncover subtle but meaningful statutory ambiguity.
138
139
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in the antiretaliation provision was clear, and it followed the Supreme
Court’s decisions interpreting the same clear language in other
statutes.148
V. IMPLICATIONS
The FCA is the primary tool by which the federal government combats
fraud perpetrated by defense contractors and healthcare providers.149
Private whistleblowers play a substantial role in exposing and reducing
fraud.150 If whistleblowers do not receive protection and compensation for
retaliation when they report fraud, they will be less likely to come
forward.151 When less fraud is reported, less money is recovered.
Ultimately, taxpayers bear the costs when the federal government pays
for deficient or nonexistent services.152
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Nesbitt, like the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in King and the Third Circuit’s decision in DiFiore, hurts
employees. Employees who are fired for trying to expose fraud in these
three circuits153 now have to show that their employer would not have
fired them had they not tried to expose that fraud.154 By contrast, in the
D.C. Circuit, the Sixth Circuit, and the Seventh Circuit, employees need
only show that their employers considered the employees’ protected
conduct when firing them, even if that conduct was not a reason the

148 Id. Although language is sometimes clear, courts seem to overstate lingual clarity.
They would do well to remember one of Justice Holmes’ many wise admonitions: “A word is
not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary
greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.”
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES,
JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 287 (1992)
(quoting Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)).
149 United States ex rel. Roby v. Boeing Co., 302 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2002) (discussing
history and provisions of the FCA).
150 S. Rep. No. 110-507, at 6–7 (2008).
151 See Id. at 5.
152 The False Claims Act, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD, https://www.taf.org/false-claimsact (last visited on Oct. 23, 2020) (noting that the FCA is “the single most important tool
U.S. taxpayers have to recover the billions of dollars stolen through fraud by U.S.
government contractors every year.”).
153 There are nine States in these three circuits: Alabama, Georgia, and Florida, in the
Eleventh Circuit; Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, in the Third Circuit; and
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas in the Fifth Circuit. About U.S. Federal Courts, FEDERAL
BAR ASSOCIATION, https://www.fedbar.org/for-the-public/about-u-s-federal-courts/ (last
visited on Nov. 13, 2020) (providing map with geographic boundaries and State composition
of each circuit).
154 Nesbitt, 945 F.3d at 1359.
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employee was fired.155 It is easier for an employee to prove that an
employer considered the whistleblowing activity when deciding to fire
someone than it is to show that a particular factor determinatively
influenced the employer’s decision. As Justice Breyer reasoned in his
dissent in Gross, employees are at a disadvantage in determining and
proving an employer’s motives for firing them, because there is an
inherent information asymmetry between employers and employees.156
It is easy for employers to contrive reasons for firing employees. Thus,
employees who are fired after stepping forward to expose fraud are less
likely to be made whole.
Further, employees in different parts of the country have to meet
different standards. The Fifth, Third, and now Eleventh Circuits157 have
ruled that “because of” requires using the but-for causation standard,
while the Sixth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have ruled that the
motivating factor causation standard applies. Because the result of FCA
whistleblower retaliation cases often turns on which standard applies,158
the Supreme Court ought to decide this issue for the whole country to
ensure uniformity around the United States.
Indeed, the Supreme Court may well address this issue. A circuit split
always increases the probability that the Supreme Court will grant
certiorari to decide an issue and resolve the division.159 Furthermore,
because the issue in Nesbitt was a pure question of law, the case is a good
vehicle for the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split on how to
interpret the phrase “because of” in the antiretaliation provision of the
FCA.
Moreover, because the Eleventh, Fifth, and Third Circuits relied on
Gross and Nassar when they decided which standard applied, the
Supreme Court may be even more likely to resolve the issue. In Gross,
the Supreme Court decided that the phrase “because of” requires
applying the but-for causation standard to ADEA discrimination

Singletary, 939 F.3d at 293; Ziebell, 806 F.3d at 953; McKenzie, 219 F.3d at 518.
Gross, 557 U.S. at 190–91 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
157 Since submitting this article to the editors in November 2020, the First Circuit has
joined the Fifth, Third, and D.C. Circuits in adopting the but-for causation standard. See
Lestage v. Coloplast Corp., 982 F.3d 37, 40–41 (1st Cir. 2020) (addressing the proper
causation standard under the FCA in an issue of first impression in the First Circuit and
holding that the but-for causation standard applies).
158 Nesbitt, 945 F.3d at 1357.
159 H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT, Harvard University Press 246, 251 (1991) (concluding that the existence
of a circuit split is the most important factor the Supreme Court considers when deciding
whether to review a case).
155
156
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claims.160 Four years later in Nassar, the Supreme Court decided it was
necessary to interpret almost identical language–“because”–in the
retaliation provision of Title VII.161 That the Supreme Court decided the
meaning of such similar language in two different statutes within a few
years suggests it may be more inclined to resolve the circuit split over
what standard to apply in FCA retaliation cases.
Alternatively, Congress could clarify which standard it prefers. The
legislative history is strong evidence that Congress intended the
motivating factor standard, and this standard furthers the FCA’s
purpose of combating fraud and encouraging whistleblowing. It is
eminently possible that the Eleventh, Fifth, and Third Circuits adopted
the wrong standard. Until Congress or the Supreme Court acts, however,
future whistleblowers are less likely to report fraud, taxpayers will
recover less money, and the harm will be disproportionately distributed
throughout the United States. Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court
should stand for it.

Douglas E. Comin
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Gross, 557 U.S. at 176.
Nassar, 570 U.S. at 360.

